Recent trends reveal the search by companies for a legal hook to prevent the undesired and unauthorized copying of information posted on websites. This quest has sparked a fundamental controversy over the ownership of information and the Internet itself. Some believe that information published on websites should be used only in a manner sanctioned by the publisher, so that "businesses can proceed without fear of unwanted trespassers who will steal or profit from the fruits of [the business'] labor. '' 1 Many argue, however, that the efficient exchange of factual information, unha mpered by any legal or technological barrier, unquestionably benefits society and weighs strongly against the enforceability of any restrictive mechanism.
extracting pricing and product information. 4 Typically, shopbots are used in conjunction with a metasite, a website that displays prices from a variety of vendors for an identical item. 5 While shopbots and metasites tend to revolve around pricing information, these systems have been employed to compile and exploit information ranging from the schedules of ticketed events to the contact information of website proprietors. 6 Websites attempting to thwart price/information indexers may invoke technological methods to prevent access by robots. 7 First, a website may incorporate a robot exclusion header, a text file that indicates that the site does not allow unauthorized robotic activity. 8 However, compliance with the Robot Exclusion Standard is entirely voluntary; a robot must be programmed to read the header and conform to its control directives before searching a website. 9 Second, if a website detects a robot's presence from repeated and rapid requests generated from a single server, the website may then block inq uiries from that server's Internet Protocol address. 10 However, attempts to block queries from a specific IP address often prove unsuccessful, because robot information requests may be effected through proxy servers, which frustrate efforts to 4 Frictions in Cyberspace, THE ECONOMIST , Nov. 20, 1999, available at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=346410; see also infra Part II.C. 5 REV. 1965 REV. , 1984 REV. -85 (2000 . 8 See Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, at http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html. To implement a robot exclusion header, the server must create a text file available on the "[local URL]/robots.txt." The file consists of only two elements: 1) the types of robots that the exclusion header is aimed at, and 2) the portion of a URL that is not to be visited by the robot. This approach has generated momentum because of its ease of implementation and the ability of a robot to access the information with only one query. See id. 9 See id. 10 245-46 (2000) . Every server maintains a unique Internet Protocol ("IP") address. When a server queries another server, the requesting computer must furnish its IP address so that the information requested may be sent. If a server detects quickly repeated queries from a specific IP address, this may indicate that the server is hosting a robot. Once robotic activity is confirmed, the requested computer may simply block queries from that specific IP address.
locate the originating IP address. 11 Finally, a website might employ password technology to limit its contents to authorized viewers. 12 However, password mechanisms currently fail to distinguish between human users and robots, and furthermore, this procedure may hinder legitimate access. 13 No technological method, therefore, currently exists to effectively prevent robot searches of websites while maintaining the site for sanctioned public use. Furthermore, the risk with any technological advancement remains, that the blocked robot will find a way to circumvent the new technological barrier, causing the searched site to become even more restrictive, in a "technological arms race."
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In response to the failure of these technological barriers, websites have asserted a variety of legal claims to protect their posted information. 15 In particular, recent cases illustrate the use of the common law doctrine of trespass to chattels to block further searches by data robots. Trespass to chattels occurs when one interferes with the possession of personal property of another, and thereby proximately causes injury. 16 In 11 See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061; Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 245-46. Proxy servers act as a locus for outgoing server queries and preserve system resources by centralizing outgoing and incoming data. Generally, use of proxy servers is limited to local users. Often due to inadequate maintenance, however, remote users may employ proxy servers. By exploiting this feature, remote users can route outgoing queries through a proxy server, thereby effectively concealing their location. A server hosting a robot may send its robotic queries through a proxy server and attach the proxy server's IP address to all of its inquiries. Any server detecting robotic activity will be lead to the proxy server and not to the actual server hosting the robot. 12 See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 245-46. 13 See id at 245-46; see also O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 1985. 14 See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 247; see also O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 1985. As those who try to thwart technological restriction mechanisms become more resourceful, so will websites then add further layers of technological protection to block the newly learned techniques. The addition of layer upon layer of technological protection influences and limits innocent website use. See O'Rourke, supra note 7, at 1985. Currently, companies exist that create and sell software with the specific purpose of evading any kind of defensive mechanism implemented to block data robots. See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 247. 15 Several of these legal claims have generally proved to be unreliable and are beyond the scope of this paper. First, while copyright law may provide a remedy for some robotic replication of website data, most shopbots only extract unprotected factual information. found that the use of shopbots to scour websites constituted a trespass to cha ttels when the unauthorized robotic activity drained the plaintiffs' system resources, thereby causing injury. 17 In a criticized aspect of these two cases, the courts disregarded that Bidder's Edge's and Verio's shopbots generated a maximum of 1.53% and 2.3% of the system queries, respectively, and essentially aggregated the hypothetical drain on system resources if multiple robots combed the plaintiffs' websites simultaneously. 18 In this fashion, the courts satisfied the requirement of actual injury with the possibility of future harm.
Given the precarious injury criterion of the trespass to chattels doctrine, dicta in both Ebay and Register.com reveal that contract law may provide a less demanding legal method of preventing the search of websites by data robots. In Ebay, the court notes that
Ebay requires consumers to accept a user agreement, which among other things, prohibits the use of any robot to monitor or duplicate content contained within the website. 19 The court then suggests that while Bidder's Edge never agreed to comply with the user agreement, if it had consented, the terms of the contract would have been binding. 20 In
Register.com, the court explicitly relies upon the enforceability of a user contract to find ). The courts found that if the defendant's use of robots were to proceed unchecked, such use would encourage others to engage in similar robot activity. Instead of only one robot indexing Ebay's data, the court hypothesized there may soon be several. And once others begin to use similar robots to collect data from a website, system use will skyrocket, and the website will suffer "irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data losses." Ebay 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 19 See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060. 20 See id. at 1060. 21 See Register.com, 2000 WL 1855145, at *5-8. 22 Rather, Register.com's agreement forbids using its data to send mass unsolicited commercial advertising. Therefore, it is not the robot gathering of data that Register.com proscribes, but rather the use of the data once it has been collected. It is this aspect of the contract that Verio breached. See id. at *5-8. 23 See id. at *8.
shopbots from scouring websites and extracting information, regardless of how the information is ultimately used.
If blocking shopbots is as simple as posting a mandatory user agreement on a website, the question arises whether this end result is acceptable and desirable. Part II of this paper argues that contrary to popular belief, enforceability of contracts that restrict shopbots ("robot restriction contracts") will aid in achieving economic efficiency, rather than hindering its progress. Part III of this paper reviews the application of common law contract doctrine and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") to robot restriction contracts. Both the trends in contract common law and UCITA sanction the enforceability of robot restriction agreements. Part IV of this paper integrates the results of the economic efficiency analysis of Part II and the contract law analysis of part III to gauge whether public policy is served by the enforcement of robot restriction contracts. This investigation indicates that the creation of a technical standard to accommodate fair use robotic activity is necessary to preserve public-interest pursuits.
II. ROBOT RESTRICTION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Conventional "brick and mortar" market systems have failed to achieve economic efficiency and perfect competition. 24 However, features of electronic markets and the Internet may reduce the frictions of traditional commerce, which have heretofore prevented an efficient market. Specifically, metasites potentially offer the consumer a costless mechanism to determine pricing and product information for any commodity offered for sale by any vendor. 25 While many have championed metasites as the panacea for imperfect competition, economic modeling and empirical evidence suggest that a rash transition to consumer reliance on metasites may impede economic efficiency, instead of promoting it. 26 Rather, an unhurried transition to a market controlled by metasites will 24 See generally infra Part II.A (discussing the elements of economic efficiency). 25 See generally infra Part II.C (discussing reduced search costs of metasites) 26 Economic modeling illustrates that an abrupt transition to metasites may result in either monopolistic pricing through vendor collusion or cyclical price wars effected through harmful mass-robot proliferation. (1883)). In the Bertrand economics model, firms produce identical products, consumers are perfectly informed, firms set prices and will elect to set prices at the marginal cost of production. In the Bertrand model, if a firm charges a price higher than the marginal cost of production it will face zero demand. Conversely, if a firm charges a price less than the cost of production, it will capture the whole market but will be unable to sustain itself as it generates losses. Therefore, all firms will fall into equilibria, charging marginal cost of production for all items. See id.
substitute a for b is 4. X will then substitute 1b for 2a with indifference. However, X would advantageously seek to exchange 1b for 3a. Consequentially, Y will gain if Y can substitute 3a for 1b, because Y's marginal rate of substitution of a for b is 4. This situation, where a mutually advantageous opportunity for substitution exists, is not economically efficient. 34 Rather, efficient economics requires that all consumers maintain the same marginal rate of substitution for all products. 35 When all consumers purchase products at the same price, the consumers' marginal rates of substitution necessarily converge. 36 Thus, a consumer enjoys the greatest utility when the marginal rate of substitution between a pair of products equals the ratio of the products' respective prices.
37
Given that comprehensive price equality is a necessary condition for economic efficiency, why must that price equal the marginal cost of production for an item?
38
Economic efficiency requires efficiency in production as well as distribution. 39 As noted above, efficiency in production exists when the production system of all commodities is maximized; in other words, production is efficient when as much of product a is created as possible, without lessening the production of product b. 40 Now, assume that 2
In a perfectly competitive environment, no vendor has any control over price. Such a vendor may sell as much or little of an item as it chooses at that item's established price, but may not charge more or less. Where prices equal the marginal cost of production a vendor has no choice but to sell its goods at that price. If economic efficiency requires that goods be priced at their marginal cost of production, then economic efficiency necessarily produces perfect competition because vendors must then charge marginal cost of production or fail. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 457 (11th ed. 1980) Note that economic efficiency and perfect competition will not necessarily be the most profitable framework for a seller. Rather a perfect monopoly and perfect price-discrimination yield the most profitable result, but both of these characteristics are inherently inconsistent with economic efficiency and perfect competition, because here, sellers would have absolute control over prices. See infra, Part II.C.2. 34 See generally DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 115-16 (1967) ; SAMUELSON, supra note 33, at 416-19. 35 See DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 115. 36 What seems like an impossibility, having equal marginal rates of substitution among consumers, becomes a reality with uniform pricing of items. Consumers select quantities of different items so that their marginal rate of substitution between each pair of items equals the ratio of their prices, thus equating marginal rates of substitution between consumers. See id. 37 See id. at 115. Thus efficient distribution exists when all consumers share the same marginal rate of substitution between all items, because then no exchange could benefit any consumer without harming others. Id. 38 Marginal cost is "the increment of Total Cost that comes from producing an increment of one unit of q." It can be calculated by subtracting the total costs of adjacent outputs. SAMUELSON, supra note 33, at 442. 39 See DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 116. 40 See id. at 116. Efficient production requires that the value of every product be the same in every firm that employs it, "for then no reallocation of resources among firms could increase the total value of the economy's output or could increase the output of any commodity without reducing the output of some consumers exist (X & Y) , who are interested in purchasing a, which has a marginal cost of production of 10. X is willing to pay up to 10 for a; Y is willing to pay up to 20 for a. If the manufacturer of a prices it at any value above 10, then to maximize profits, the manufacturer will produce only 1a, where production efficiency necessitates the maximum possible output, or 2a. Thus, economic efficiency requires that a product a be priced uniformly and at the marginal cost of production.
B. Why Sellers Object to Price Indexing
The question arises why companies would object to shopbot price indexing of their products. One might initially presume that vendors would appreciate the free publicity, which metasites offer. For example, a vendor would benefit when a consumer who had not considered purchasing from the vendor, elects to do so based on metasite use. Numerous factors, however, counteract any shopbot benefit.
First, if contrary to the economic modeling, 41 shopbot and metasite use will inevitably lead to marginal cost of production prices through lower search costs, this in turn will cause reduced seller profits. By preserving elevated search costs, vendors maintain market power, through which they will exploit price dispersion. 42 Therefore, despite the positive aspects of shopbot use for established sellers, several additional factors indicate metasite prevalence will produce negative consequences on their business.
C. Metasite Inefficiency
Given that products priced at their marginal cost of production is a condition for economic efficiency, the question arises whether the reduced search costs associated with shopbots and metasites will inevitably lead to lower prices, unvarying among vendors.
Shopbots automatically request pricing and product information from multiple online retailers. In response to a consumer's query of a metasite, a shopbot can within seconds 46 This is the weaker of the two arguments. As metasites progress they will offer more and more seller information. Currently, metasites, in addition to price, offer product information, and seller delivery track record, seller warranty and return policy, and customer satisfaction. Thus, a shopbot performs in a matter of seconds what a human consumer would be unable to accomplish in hours. Shopbots, therefore, appear to promise a substantial reduction in the costs of obtaining and distributing product and pricing information, a generally accepted economic boon, reducing market friction and enhancing economic efficiency. 52 While negligible search costs, generating a free flow of product and pricing information, are a prerequisite for prices set at the marginal cost of production, these frictionless searches do not by their nature alone generate economic efficiency. Rather, economic modeling and empirical evidence suggest that: 1) unrestrained shopbot implementation may lead to either monopolistic practices or price wars, which unduly tax the Internet infrastructure, and 2) factors unrelated to search costs preserve price dispersion, frustrating any move toward economic efficiency.
Economic Modeling of Unmonitored Shopbot Proliferation
Traditional economic models commonly assume that consumer search costs are negligible. 53 Furthermore, in a market system of homogeneous products and inconsequential search costs, the conventional Bertrand economics model expects that price competition among vendors in an efficient market will reduce prices to the marginal cost of production, with sellers generating zero profits. 54 oligopolistic pricing practices and eliminate seller profit. 56 However, economic modeling suggests that a mass destabilization will bring adverse economic consequences, resulting in higher prices through formation of new oligopolies or through a mass encumbrance of the Internet's infrastructure.
To illustrate why unrestrained shopbot mecha nics may result in either monopolistic pricing practices or substantial burdens on the Internet, consider a market with a product a, offered for sale by several vendors, S, to a significantly larger number of potential purchasers, B. 57 The value of a to a particular purchaser b is v b . Therefore, a consumer purchases a when the price is less than or equal to v b, thus obtaining a utility of v b -p, when a transaction occurs and a utility of zero otherwise. 58 Further, assume that consumers contemplate the price of a product based on 1 of 2 different approaches: 1) the consumer will purchase from the first seller that offers a for a price less than or equal to v b , or 2) the consumer will search all vendors and select the vendor that has priced a at the lowest value, assuming the price is less than or equal to v b . 59 Note that option 2 is available only with an Internet shopbot/metasite scheme and that in a traditional market, consumers would be forced to select option 1 or a drastically diluted form of option 2, thus fundamentally altering the model. A particular seller's profit is equal to the difference in price and cost multiplied by the demand for a of that seller. 60 The demand of a particular seller becomes a probability function of two components: a) consumers of type 1 have a 1/S probability of selecting the specific seller s, and b) consumers of type 2 will select a seller s, based on the probability that s offers a at a lower price than other 56 See id. (asserting that the rise of the electronic marketplace will fundamentally change the three primary functions of the marketplace: a) to match buyers and sellers, b) to facilitate the exchange of information, goods, and services, and c) to provide an institutional infrastructure); Robert Kuttner, However, the shopbot/metasite scheme promises a balance between type 1 and type 2 consumers, as a shift to shopbot use will occur gradually rather than suddenly and completely. What then is the effect of this mix of consumers? Computations based on the above model reveal that as expected, vendor competition will lead to decreased prices through shopbot stimulation of competition. 65 However, the reduction in price does not occur instantaneously and does not immediately achieve marginal cost. Rather, the reductions will be incremental based upon consumer reaction and the pricing of other vendors. The question then arises as to how vendors will adjust their prices to maximize profits.
If vendors were able to price products according to an idealistic game-theoretic model, then prices would decrease to marginal cost. 66 Imperfect information, however, forces vendors to choose from the myopically optimal method, the derivative-following method, or a combination thereof. 67 A seller adhering to the derivative-following method tests incremental increases and decreases in its price, continuing to adjust in the same 61 A "Nash Equilibrium," is a price vector from which a group of sellers maximizes their profits and have no incentive to deviate. However, the shopbot model presented of mixed consumers of type 1 and type 2 cannot yield a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, which could exist if all consumers were of type 2. At an equilibrium based on the shopbot model, at least one seller must offer a for p<v. However, this is not a stable condition and this seller has an incentive to deviate. Nevertheless, a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium can exist based on the shopbot model, which would lead to prices at the marginal cost of production if vendors could price according to a perfect game -theoretic model. See id. at *5-9. 62 See id. at *5. Both elements of the demand function must also take into consideration whether a is priced at or below v b . 63 Finally, price discrimination provides another source of price dispersion unrelated to search costs. Price discrimination exists when markets have been segmented between high and low valuation consumers, "such that the sellers can post a high price that high demand consumers will find attractive given their knowledge about the products in question." 96 To illustrate price discrimination consider a product a, with a marginal cost of production of 9. Consider 10 consumers Q, all of whom are willing to pay up to 13 for a. Further, consider 1 consumer R, who is willing to pay up to 60 for a. How does the vendor price a? To maximize profits, the vendor will price a at 60, sell it to R, and realize a profit of 51. If the vendor were able to sell a for 13 to Q but at 60 to R, the vendor would realize a profit of (10*4)+(1*51)=91. Thus, retailers may achieve greater income through price discrimination. Thus, a consumer who elected not to engage in the price comparing process risked missing the pricing benefit, but avoided a potentially lengthy price comparison procedure and possible fruitless result. 100 While price discrimination obviates economic efficiency, as it necessarily leads to different marginal rates of substitution, it may offer some consumers with lower prices and the ability to purchase where none existed before.
Therefore, even if the reduced search costs of the Internet would consequently lead to lower prices, other factors impede this reduction. Product heterogeneity, convenience tools, trust in brands, consumer lock-ins, and price discrimination all may contribute to price dispersion on the Internet, unrelated to search costs.
D. Summary of Economic Analysis
The economic analysis of metasites yields surprising observations. First, it is often in the sellers' interests to initially limit shopbot extraction of their pricing and product information, and sellers will presumably take steps to effect this preference.
Second, economic modeling demonstrates that shopbot use will not inevitably lead to lower prices and economic efficiency, but rather will likely induce price wars characterized by uncontrolled and damaging robot use. Finally, in addition to search costs, other factors contribute directly to price dispersion, negating any reduction in price by diminished search costs.
Because comprehensive shopbot access would overly tax a system without reducing prices, and potentially redistribute income in a seller-and consumer-detrimental manner, a combination of legal and technical mechanisms that will safeguard the Internet markets in the transition to metasite use is warranted. The economic modeling of metasites reveals that the pacing of price resetting is a crucial issue directly related to robot proliferation. Given established sellers' reluctance to participate in price indexing, if they were able to invoke and rely upon legal and technical mechanisms to prohibit 99 See Wiseman, supra note 82, at *23. 100 A study of Books.com found that the average savings to a consumer who used the price comparison mechanism was $.15 and that the procedure could take up to 1 minute. Thus, in essence, Books.com robot use on their websites, this would curtail the potential threat of system overload while permitting metasite functioning. 101 With the advancements of metasites to compare elements in addition to price, the other factors producing price dispersion will fade, assuming they are in fact specious, thus leading to lowered search costs, without robot proliferation. 102 Therefore, as metasites become a staple for consumers, branded retailers that had prevented shopbot access will find it in their interest to permit shopbot indexing. 103 In this fashion, we realize a complete transition to metasite use, while avoiding cyclical and taxing price wars, by establishing a time control mechanism. in computer information has motivated data owners to eschew governmental protection discriminated on the basis of convenience and potential savings. It apparently found that enough consumers would find the process too time-consuming to justify the savings. See id. at *23. 101 Presumably metasites would continue to index retailers for which the benefits of price indexing outweighed the negative aspects, specifically the less branded retailers. 102 If these factors did not wane, but continued to cause price dispersion, then a static market would continue to exist, with consumers choosing well-branded but more expensive retailers, though the desired product is offered for less by other vendors. This presumably is a preferred state to the cyclical price wars, which would occur without this legal mechanism.
and embrace security through private agreement. 107 Initially, to prevent the pirating of software, companies implemented shrinkwrap contracts, or unsigned licensing agreements accompanying the sale of computer software, for the purpose of binding the purchaser when he or she opened the package. 108 Clickwrap agreements soon followed, referring to contractual terms present on websites. 109 These web-based contracts range from chat-room access agreements to software-downloading arrangements and include terms ranging from indemnity to forum selection. 110 While some websites induce users to express consent by having them click on an "I accept" button, other websites simply condition use of the site on an implicit acceptance of displayed contractual terms.
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If such clickwrap agreements are valid, a website could theoretically prevent robots from indexing the site's data by displaying a simple notice, which reads: "by accessing this website, the user agrees not to employ any robot to copy the content of the website." 112 Can it be that simple? Were all the arguments invoking trespass to chattels and the CFAA unnecessarily complicated? Three elements may stand as obstacles to the enforceability of robot restriction contracts: 1) the doctrines of consent, contract of adhesion, and unconscionability; 2) copyright preemption; and 3) whether robots may assent to contract formation. Despite these ostensible barriers, both contract case law and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act indicate that robot restriction contracts are enforceable.
A. Shinkwrap and Clickwrap Caselaw
While for years, shrinkwrap licenses were of questionable legality, ProCD v.
Zeidenberg marked a dramatic shift in the courts' thinking about these contracts. In
ProCD, the defendant purchased a software compilation of telephone numbers, extracted the records from the database and incorporated them into his own computer program, thereby breaching the shrinkwrap agreement. 113 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the 7 th Circuit, declared that manufacturers might enter into private contracts limiting the use of their products. 114 Many argue that shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements constitute unenforceable contracts of adhesion, where the offeree is frequently unaware he or she is entering into a contract. 115 The court in ProCD disregarded contract of adhesion and lack of consent arguments, noting that the offeror, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct. 116 Furthermore, the offeror may dictate the category of action or conduct that constitutes an acceptance. 117 Here, ProCD offered a contract that the consumer could choose to accept by using the software. Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook noted in a prior case that a contract "need not be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome." 118 The court pushed contextual unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general." Therefore, given the direct parallels between robot restriction contracts and the shrinkwrap agreement in ProCD, and the supplemental weight of the clickwrap caselaw, robot restriction contracts appear enforceable under contemporary contract law.
Copyright preemption presents another potential obstacle to the enforcement of robot restriction contracts through state contract law. Copyright law attempts to maintain a balance between the creators' and users' interests by protecting works of authorship, but leaving elements such as ideas, facts and procedures within the public domain.
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The question thus arises whether this balance is subject to variation by contract or whether the balance embodies unwavering federal policy positions. In other words, may private parties create intellectual property rights through contract where no right existed before? In the context of robot restriction agreements, the issue becomes whether the factual pricing information, which is planted in the public domain by copyright law, may be rendered proprietary through contract.
In ProCD, the district court found that it would alter the delicate balance of copyright law to allow parties to contract around it. 124 Judge Easterbrook reversed, however, finding that the contract rights were not "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright." 125 The court reasoned that while copyright law provides a right against the world, contract rights affect only the parties to the contract and that "strangers may do as they please. 128 Id. at 1455. But Judge Easterbrook's stance on copyright preemption has generated significant controversy. For example, Dennis Karjala draws a distinction between widely accessible and generally inaccessible works. For widely accessible works, Professor Karjala argues that the copyright scheme does not merely serve as a default position that may be reordered through private contract. Rather, "to allow private reordering of these rights by agreement between the copyright owner and the direct users . . . would be to ignore the interest of the general public that the copyright balances have been so carefully designed to protect. Karjala, supra note 123, at 518-19. Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook's opinion has been criticized for failing to address whether the enforcement of state contract law may be preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as opposed to Section 301 of the Copyright Act, which he focuses on. See id. at 522.
on behalf of and under control of the principal party. 130 When an agent acts according to his or her authority, the agent has the power to affect the legal status of the principal to the same extent as if the principal had acted. 131 As a result, when an agent enters into a contract with a third party, that third party may subsequently enforce the contract against the principal. 132 Therefore, under agency law, it appears that a robot that enters into a clickwrap agreement, either by clicking on an "I accept button," or disregarding the express protocol set forth in a robot exclusion header, binds the person who designed and implemented the robot.
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Therefore, the doctrines of assent and contract of adhesion, copyright preemption, and robot contracting fail to present concrete obstacles to the enforceability of robot restriction agreements under current contract common law.
B. UCITA and Robot Restriction Agreements
Spurred by the need for uniformity within the realm of non-tangible information contracting, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") composed and disseminated the Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act ("UCITA"). 134 UCITA, a model contract law to be adopted by individual states, governs agreements that involve "computer information transactions," 135 and has garnered significant support, 136 but also engendered strident opposition. 137 Computer information refers to "information in electronic form which is obtained from or through the use of a computer . intellectual property law establishes a balance between these two ends of the spectrum, the question arises whether the use of contract law as a proxy for intellectual property law disregards the public use aspect of information. In the context of robot restriction agreements, the question becomes whether denying robots access to pricing and product information frustrates valuable public use.
Contract common law and UCITA both support the enforceability of robot restriction agreements. This contracting regime thus places pricing and product information at the extreme proprietary end of the dual information spectrum; these legal systems permit uncomplicated formation of contracts that grant wide-ranging control of factual informa tion and restrict even potentially beneficial public use of the data. The question then arises whether any beneficial use of product and pricing information outweighs the need to afford proprietary rights to the records. Economic analysis has revealed: 1) that unencumbered metasite activity leads to price wars, which may well result in mass system strain or price premiums; and 2) even if reduced search costs necessarily lead to lower prices, factors unrelated to search costs will maintain price dispersion. Therefore, economic analysis provides an incentive to lean in favor of proprietary interests over the public use of pricing and product data.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine beneficial uses of pricing and product data. First, while pricing data itself may prove of little use in the progress of education, science and research, data robots and metasites are far from limited to pricing 156 See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 115, at 884.
information. Rather, data robots can potentially collect and compile information regarding any subject matter, including addresses and contact information, research results, and event and transportation scheduling. Furthermore, metasites continue to offer consumers increasingly more information in addition to price, such as warranty provisions, shipping processes, and consumer satisfaction. Thus, the ease of formation of robot restriction agreements may limit valid and worthwhile public access to an unlimited range of data. For example, research on factors unrelated to search costs, which maintain price dispersion, may promote the elimination of these factors (if they are in fact false), thereby allowing lower-search costs to lead to marginal cost of production pricing through controlled shopbot implementation.
Second, the detrimental first prong of the economic analysis was predicated upon shopbots and metasites acting as profit-seeking enterprises. Under this model, metasites had incentives to satisfy as many queries as rapidly as possible, thus furthering disadvantageous price wars. However, a public interest, non-profit metasite might sidestep this obstacle by limiting its queries, thereby removing an essential link in the perpetration of retailer price-query/price-resetting functions. 158 Furthermore, if such a non-profit, public interest metasite existed, it might provide improved opportunities for the price-affecting factors unrelated to search costs to wane. Therefore, concrete publicuse interests exist for product and pricing information.
How then should contract law permit acceptable public use of pricing and product information, while permitting retailers to control access to pricing data and thereby preserve the integrity of online markets? A potential solution would be the development of a technical standard modeled after the principles of the fair use defense to federal copyright infringement. The fair use defense permits courts to avoid rigid application of the law when it would unfairly restrict dissemination of useful works to the public.
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Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists four factors to consider when deciding whether a 157 See id. at 884-85. 158 If for example a metasite updated its prices only once an hour or once a day, this would eliminate the possibility of retailers relying on metasites to check other retailer's prices and adjust their own prices accordingly. Enforceability of robot restriction agreements, which rely upon the Robot Exclusion Standard would, as discussed, also result in a limitation of shopbot queries, thereby accomplishing the same result public use is justified: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the protected work, 3) the effect of the use upon the potential markets for the work, and 4) the amount of the work used. 160 A viable fair-use standard of robot accommodation could directly parallel the federal copyright provisions and include a condition limiting the frequency of robot use. This technical standard could be incorporated within the robot exclusion header, which would already be used to couch the robot restrictive contractual terms.
Therefore, if one were to contemplate a non-profit metasite, which performed only a limited number of inquiries (as opposed to a commercial metasite that had an economic incentive to maximize its inquiries), such a use would satisfy a technical standard that focused on the character of the information collected and the process used to collect it. The purpose and character of the use reflect strong economic policy. The nature of the work, i.e., factual pricing data, engenders less sympathy if taken than other forms of protected work, because the substance of prices is inherently intended to be disseminated to consumers. Furthermore, the technical standard could indicate the maximum frequency of robot queries that the fair use standard will tolerate. 161 Therefore, a technical standard accommodating fair use shopbot operation would prove viable and beneficial in restoring the balance of the dual nature of information, while preserving the economic and proprietary incentives.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Internet offers the potential to radically transform economic markets and consumerism, we must not be rash in assuming that by its nature it will inherently accomplish this goal. Rather, the law should recognize that the reduced search costs of the Internet create as many dangers as they offer remedies. While reduced search costs are inherently beneficial, to superimpose them upon a market and technological structure unprepared to accommodate them, while ignoring the potentially adverse consequences, 159 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 160 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
direction of Internet markets encourages a more balanced acquiescence to pricebots and metasites. Enforceability of robot restriction contracts and the addition of a fair use technical standard offers a stable and evenhanded approach to encouraging economic efficiency and avoiding the dangers of reckless reliance on the Internet.
